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When the Stranger says: ‘What is the meaning of this city? 
Do you huddle close together because you love each other?’ 
What will you answer?  ‘We all dwell together 
To make money from each other’? or ‘This is a community’?   
And the Stranger will depart and return to the desert. 
O my soul, be prepared for the coming of the Stranger,  
Be prepared for him who knows how to ask questions.∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Great stories should be re-told.  Does corporate law tell a story?1  
What is the story?  Who is telling the story?  To whom?  Is it being re-told?  
Who is re-telling it and what are they saying? 
Corporate law initially permits rather than tells a story.  Indeed, it 
permits the telling of many stories sharing a common theme.  Its loose statu-
tory constraints allow a master narrative of business persons eagerly pur-
suing self-interest and seeking the good life as they see it.  This everyday 
plotline unfolds in remarkably diverse ways as to the particulars, but it typi-
cally draws scant attention in the legal community.2  Another voice in cor-
porate law, however, occasionally moves into the foreground to interrupt 
and tell its own story—a counter-narrative demanding a measure of self-
restraint—when those who direct or manage company affairs press self-gain 
(or sloth) to the point of intolerable excess.  The tellers of these stories are 
judges—especially Delaware’s judges—when, sitting in equity,3 they in-
  
  ∗∗ Excerpt from T. S. ELIOT, Choruses from “The Rock”, in COLLECTED POEMS 
1909-1962 145, 156-57 (1991). 
 1. This is the provocative question posed by Professor Mae Kuykendall.  Mae 
Kuykendall, No Imagination: The Marginal Role of Narrative in Corporate Law, 55 BUFF. L. 
REV. 537, 541 (2007) (“Corporate law is abstract, because its subject is not readily reducible 
to human stories.”). 
 2. George Eliot’s closing line in her novel Middlemarch captures the obscurity in 
which most humans, including businesspersons, toil: “[F]or the growing good of the world is 
partly dependent on unhistoric acts; and that things are not so ill with you and me as they 
might have been, is half owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in 
unvisited tombs.”  GEORGE ELIOT, MIDDLEMARCH: A STUDY OF PROVINCIAL LIFE 640 (Gre-
gory Maertz ed., Broadview Press 2004) (1872).  In terms of narrativizing, we would say 
these hidden “stories” have not been told, their “voices” are not heard. 
 3. The Chancery Court of Delaware is a court of equity.  See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 
10, § 341 (Supp. 2008).  As stated by former Delaware Chancellor William Allen: 
The duties [corporate officers and directors] owe to shareholders with respect to 
the exercise of their legal power over corporate property supervene their legal 
rights, are imposed by equity and are recognized and enforced exclusively by a 
court of equity. 
Chancery takes jurisdiction over “fiduciary” relationships because equity, not 
law, is the source of the right asserted. 
McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987) (citations omitted). 
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voke the discourse of fiduciary duty to confront the dominant story line and 
reshape how corporate managers may use the vast power conferred by law. 
Corporate law, then, is bi-vocal.  The “law” found in corporate statutes 
is disarmingly prosaic, and is well known to be permissive, enabling, and 
expansive in its thrust;4 it is not regulatory or prohibitory, nor does it seek to 
inhibit or constrain.  It seems, moreover, to be as morally “neutral” as it is 
radically liberating.  At the same time, corporate statutes consolidate power 
in the hands of a select few—directors and managers.5  In a perfect world, 
the few would diligently and devotedly serve the common (“corporate”) 
good.6  As another grand narrative tells us, however, we live in a “fallen” 
world,7 and so the mixture of lax law and flawed human nature frequently 
leads, not surprisingly, to the unleashing of boundless ambition, vanity, 
avarice, duplicity, and all manner of sordid mischief.  This is the master 
narrative permitted, but not mandated or proscribed, by the initial amorality 
of corporate law.  The other dialect of corporate law—equity—is, in con-
trast, a morally laden discourse that serves to counter, temper, and tame the 
failings of human desire.  In short, equity seeks to “redeem” that which is 
fallen. 
This Article will argue that corporate law permits a master narrative 
that is highlighted and made legally visible only when challenged by equi-
ty’s counter-narrative, with which it is complicit.8  In unveiling discrete 
stories within the master narrative, Delaware’s judges tell the tale of other 
protagonists—the “saints and sinners” described by Edward Rock9—and 
then offer their own assessments of those accounts.  These appraisals are 
  
 4. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1417 (1989) (“The corporate code in almost every state is an ‘enabl-
ing’ statute.”).  Corporate statutes do contain certain mandatory provisions, to be sure, but 
they are not strong constraints and often can be avoided by careful planning.  See Bernard S. 
Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542 
(1990); Elvin R. Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely “Enabling”?, 50 
CORNELL L.Q. 599 (1965). 
 5. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (“The business and affairs of 
[a] corporation . . . [are] managed by or under the direction of the board of directors.”). 
 6. As Professors Meyer and Gustafson note, the linkage between individual welfare 
and the public good forms part of “the oldest moral traditions of the West, which held that 
persons should pursue not only proper individual self-fulfillment but also the common good 
and that these two ends were mutually implicated.”  John R. Meyer & James M. Gustafson, 
Epilogue: For Whom Does the Corporation Toil?, in THE U.S. BUSINESS CORPORATION 211, 
230 (John R. Meyer & James M. Gustafson eds., 1988). 
 7. The biblical account of humanity’s fall is found in the third chapter of the book 
of Genesis.  Genesis 3 (New International Version).  
 8. On counter-narrative and complicity, see Michael Bamberg, Considering Coun-
ter Narratives, in CONSIDERING COUNTER-NARRATIVES: NARRATING, RESISTING, MAKING 
SENSE 351 (Michael Bamberg & Molly Andrews eds., 2004). 
 9. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law 
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997). 
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indeed, as Rock contends, written in normatively saturated and judgmental 
language that, in tone and words, resembles sermons and parables.10  The 
problem in corporate law, however, is not in the genre of telling but in the 
genre of re-telling, because these sermons and parables lose their cautionary 
and inhibitory force if they are not properly re-told.  If corporate law homi-
lies are read only by lawyers or if, in being recounted to business persons, 
their moral flavor is drained in favor of discerning the “rule” or “best prac-
tice,” then equity’s co-telling role in the overall business narrative is once 
again, as at the outset, subdued by law.11 
To see that this may be happening in corporate law, this Article draws 
on a biblical narrative.  To oversimplify this sweeping account, the world 
was created by God but, rather quickly, humans, exercising free will, sinned 
and “fell” until God, through Christ, redeemed and graciously saved human-
ity.12  The redemption story culminates for Christians in the Gospels, where 
Christ’s life and moral teachings are told from four vantage points.  The 
teachings, for the most part, are conveyed by didactic parables and sermons 
emphasizing overarching principles and standards, not detailed rules or 
codes of conduct.  Critically, moreover, His apostles were exhorted not to 
keep the stories to themselves.  Rather, they were commissioned to go forth 
and re-tell the Good News to the whole world.13  The New Testament’s 
Epistles—especially the Pauline Epistles14—carry the news out into the 
broader community and explain its meaning for everyday communal life, 
while retaining its pervasive moral tenor. 
In a parallel way, equity’s role in corporate law is redemptive, and De-
laware’s chancellors preach and teach in parables and sermons.  In response 
to law’s tale of unbridled freedom, the chancellors speak of restraint.  Moral 
drama arises from this clash.  This is seen not only in Rock’s discussion of 
several noteworthy judicial opinions from the late 1980s and early 1990s,15 
but also in Chancellor William Chandler’s memorable opinion in the high-
  
 10. Id. at 1015-16, 1106.  
 11. See MARGARET HALLIWELL, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE IN A 
CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 6 (1997) (“Fundamental misconceptions of equity abound . . . 
because of a persistent refusal to acknowledge that equity is, by its very nature, subversive of 
the law.”). 
 12. See supra note 7; Colossians 1:14. 
 13. Matthew 28:19-20 (“[G]o and make disciples of all nations . . . teaching them to 
obey everything I have commanded you.”); Luke 9:1-2 (“When Jesus had called the Twelve 
together, he . . . sent them out to preach the kingdom of God . . . .”). 
 14. See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text. 
 15. Rock, supra note 9, at 1022-63.  Rock cites both Chancery and Supreme Court 
opinions.  Id.  These two kinds of opinions do differ in that the chancellors listen to and 
observe firsthand the accounts of others, and then compose a coherent original storyline, 
unlike judges on appeal who largely accept the original account.  Id.  Given standards of 
appellate judicial review, moreover, the chancellor’s organizing account, factually, generally 
will prevail.  
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profile Disney case of 2005.16  Unlike the re-tellers of the biblical gospel, 
however, the “apostles” of corporate law—the elite corporate bar—
frequently screen out the moral tone when writing their “epistles” about 
Disney, as seen in twelve sample letters.17  By contrast, newspaper accounts 
do a far better job of preserving and transmitting the moral fervor of the 
Chancellor’s judicial sermon.18 
Part I of the Article briefly summarizes Professor Rock’s thesis.  Part 
II invokes the biblical narrative as a structure for better understanding cor-
porate law and its formulation and transmission.  Part III examines the Dis-
ney decision as a prime example of a sermon laced with moral criticism and 
disapproval as a spur to better conduct and a deeper “spiritual” understand-
ing of what it means to be a faithful director.  Part IV details how twelve 
apostles re-tell the story of the Disney opinion–sermon in their epistles to 
clients, contrasting them with several newspaper accounts.  It is concluded 
that to maintain narrative balance in the two-fold design of corporate law, 
the very freedom to pursue the master narrative made possible by slack sta-
tutes depends on equity’s moral sensibility and counter-narrative being fully 
re-told to business actors. 
I.  PROFESSOR ROCK’S THESIS 
In an important article published in 1997,19 Professor Edward Rock 
posed three questions about the production of corporate law: “First, how is 
the content of corporate law rules and standards determined?  Second, how 
are they generated?  And third, how are they communicated to officers and 
directors?”20  Rock’s article deliberately ignores the first question and “fo-
cus[es] on the second and third questions, which go to the mechanisms of 
corporate law.”21 
As to the second question, Rock concludes that Delaware courts ex-
pound on the fiduciary duties of directors through “fact-intensive, norma-
tively saturated” descriptions of saintly and sinful conduct.22  These descrip-
tions, according to Rock, serve to elucidate  appropriate standards of con-
duct “through a distinctively narrative process, leading to a set of stories 
that is typically not reducible to a rule.”23  He goes on to describe these judi-
  
 16. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 17. See infra Subsection IV.B.2. 
 18. See infra Subsection IV.B.1. 
 19. Rock, supra note 9. 
 20. Id. at 1014. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1015.  See also id. at 1040 (noting the “normatively charged quality of the 
opinions”). 
 23. Id. at 1016. 
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cial opinions, variously, as “corporate law sermons,”24 “stories,”25 “pa-
rables,”26 “morality tales,”27 and “a morality play.”28 
As to the all-important third question—that of how judicial pro-
nouncements are actually transmitted—Rock only very briefly “begin[s] to 
trace” an answer.29  He looks quickly at newspaper accounts of certain high-
profile cases involving management buyouts of public companies and at 
three law firms’ memoranda to clients about these cases.30  Only one firm’s 
memorandum discusses director duties specifically, however, leading Rock 
to conclude that it is “consistent with my hypothesis but provide[s] relative-
ly little direct support.”31  Overall, he concludes that “[t]he mechanism by 
which Delaware opinions influence conduct is ultimately an empirical ques-
tion, the full description of which awaits further research.”32 
Rock’s insightful conception of corporate law focuses on a single 
source, decisional law, not corporate statutes, which he recognizes as enabl-
ing in thrust.33  The chief quality of each legal source, in fact, vitally de-
pends on the other.  This is the inevitable complicity of law and equity in 
the corporate area, where neither silences its longtime counterpart in co-
narration.  Importantly, Rock’s observations can be broadened and extended 
by viewing them in relation to a larger, well-known narrative from which 
Rock could have derived his parable and sermon rubric, that is, the biblical 
narrative.  Doing so confirms the view that equity judges serve as expound-
ers of standards through the preaching of sermons and parables, a fitting 
practice given that “the first English chancellors were . . . clerics.”34  It also 
highlights the judiciary’s key role (and success) in employing a morally 
laden, redemptive counter-narrative to corporate law’s amoral master narra-
tive, while exposing the corporate bar’s apostolic failure to pass along simi-
larly moral epistles to the larger corporate community, instead reverting to 
the more neutral “rule talk” of law. 
  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1101.  
 28. Id. at 1047.  
 29. Id. at 1019.  
 30. Id. at 1064-68, 1070-72.  
 31. Id. at 1070. 
 32. Id. at 1106.  Although Rock’s article indicates that he and a colleague were 
undertaking such research, id. at 1020 n.19, he recently confirmed to the author that they 
have not done so.  E-mail from Edward B. Rock to author (May 4, 2009) (on file with au-
thor).  
 33. Id. at 1101-02.  
 34. DAVID SCIULLI, CORPORATE POWER IN CIVIL SOCIETY 371 n.44 (2001).  
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II.  THE BIBLICAL NARRATIVE IN SHORT 
The theologian Cyrus Ingerson Scofield described the Bible as a book 
that “at once provokes and baffles study.”35  The Bible, of course, is grand 
narrative, offered from multiple vantage points, where nothing is told at 
once but its message progressively unfolds, “like a picture wrought out in 
mosaics.”36  It provides history, prophecy, moral instruction, and horrific 
stories of human depravity, cruelty, and folly countered by stirring stories of 
sacrifice, saintliness, and restoration.  Throughout human history, the Bible 
has played an influential role in shaping moral conduct through, for exam-
ple, the Ten Commandments,37 the Proverbs,38 the Sermon on the Mount,39 
and the parable of the Good Samaritan.40  It also has contributed enormously 
to Western literature.41  Its ancient admonition against “serving two mas-
ters” underlies the fiduciary duty of loyalty in corporate law.42  And it has 
much to say about “faithfulness” in general,43 the core demand of a fidu-
ciary’s loyal behavior.44 
  
 35. Preface to THE HOLY BIBLE ix (C. I. Scofield ed., 1967) (1917). 
 36. Id.  
 37. Exodus 20:1-17. 
 38. See Proverbs (New International Version).  The Hebrew word “mashal” trans-
lated as “proverb” is also sometimes translated as “parable.”  See Ezekiel 17:2; FRANCIS 
BROWN ET AL., A HEBREW AND ENGLISH LEXICON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 605 (Edward 
Robinson trans., Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1906) (1891).  Proverbs and parables frequently 
use figurative language, even though both are designed to give practical advice about the art 
of living. 
 39. Matthew 5-7.  
 40. Luke 10:25-37.  
 41. See MARIE WACHLIN & BYRON R. JOHNSON, BIBLE LITERACY REPORT 10-14 
(2005) (noting allusions and references to the Bible in the works of Shakespeare, John Stein-
beck, George Orwell, William Faulkner, and other writers).  Dean Saul Levmore has noted 
that among “the most penetrating and long-lived sagas are those found in the Bible and clas-
sical literature.  A good number of stories found in the Bible and in Homer . . . [introduce] 
flawed, multidimensional heros.”  Saul P. Levmore, Fables, Sagas, and Laws, 33 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 485, 493-94 (1997). 
 42. Matthew 6:24 (“No one can serve two masters . . . .”).  “Numerous fiduciary 
[duty] cases in the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century . . . cited th[is] 
biblical prohibition . . . in their discussion[] of loyalty.”  Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Re-
membering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 53 n.150 (2003) 
[hereinafter Johnson, After Enron].  The phrase continues to be used in the fiduciary duty 
context.  See, e.g., John Bogle, The Fiduciary Principle:  “No Man Can Serve Two Masters,” 
Lecture at Columbia University School of Business (Apr. 1, 2009) (on file with author). 
 43. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (2006) [hereinafter Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness].  
 44. Chancellor Chandler in the Disney case described the traditional fiduciary duties 
of care and loyalty as “but constituent elements of the overarching concepts of allegiance, 
devotion and faithfulness that must guide the conduct of every fiduciary.”  In re Walt Disney 
Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005).  See also Johnson, Faith and 
Faithfulness, supra note 43, at 25-28 (describing Chandler’s elaboration of “faithfulness”).  
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With 613 Old Testament commandments and such New Testament 
commandments in favor of foot washing45 and against jewelry,46 the Bible, 
of course, can be read, wrongly, as the ultimate legalistic rulebook.  It also 
has engendered heated interpretive debates within the believing community, 
some of which led to historic ruptures in the Christian church.47  And, of 
course, throughout human history it has had a large number of critics and 
scoffers.48  As observed by Scofield, however, even “the non-believer in its 
authority rightly feels that it is unintelligent to remain in almost total ignor-
ance of the most famous and ancient of books.”49 
This Article, however, more narrowly draws on the Bible for three 
ways in which it can shed light on corporate law discourse.  First, its overall 
narrative of God’s Creation, mankind’s Fall (and the resulting problem of 
Sin), and the Redemption of humanity by the gracious sacrificial work of 
Christ illuminates how law reveals the need for redemption but cannot itself 
achieve it.  Second, its articulation of an overarching moral command—i.e., 
love your neighbor as yourself50—is both a standard (not a rule) and is said 
to represent the fulfillment of all law.51  Likewise, the grammar of equity is 
broad standards—i.e., loyalty, fairness, care—not narrow rules to offer 
moral guidance.52  Third, the narrative structure of the New Testament re-
veals a progressive dissemination and re-telling of core moral teachings.  
That is, the teachings of Christ’s parables and sermons appear in the Gos-
pels, followed by the Apostles (as messengers) taking the Good News into 
the larger world,53 in part through the Epistles by which believers are taught, 
exhorted, and comforted.  These three threads will be briefly elaborated 
here. 
  
 45. John 13:14. 
 46. 1 Peter 3:3.  
 47. The split into the Western (Latin) and Eastern (Orthodox) branches and the 
sixteenth century Protestant Reformation are the outstanding examples.  
 48. Modern noted scoffers include Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, Sam 
Harris, and Bill Maher.  See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2006); CHRISTOPHER 
HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: HOW RELIGION POISONS EVERYTHING (2007); SAM HARRIS, 
THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE OF REASON (2004).  William Maher 
wrote and acted in the 2008 film Religulous, which satirizes religious belief.  
 49. THE HOLY BIBLE, supra note 35, at ix.  
 50. Mark 12:31.  
 51. Romans 13:8 (“[H]e who loves his fellowman has fulfilled the law.”); id. 13:10 
(“[T]herefore love is the fulfillment of the law.”).  See also James 2:8 and Galatians 5:14.  
 52. See generally Johnson, After Enron, supra note 42. 
 53. Mark 3:14. 
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A.  Redemption 
In the Creation story, Adam and Eve, possessing free will, disobey 
God.54  Having sinned, they are banished from Eden,55 separated from God, 
and death looms. The problem: how can humans and God reconcile and 
restore human−divine fellowship?  One wrong answer: obey law.  God de-
mands justice but humans are flawed and cannot set matters right.  Law’s 
purpose, then, was to reveal the problem of sin, not to surmount it.56  God 
Himself, through divine grace (not human works), paid humanity’s sin debt 
and reestablished the possibility of communion with God.57  In short, hu-
manity needs redemption but it does not come by law.58 
Within the corporate law framework, the statutory law enacted by leg-
islatures likewise lacks power or any pretense to do much that is affirma-
tively good.  The overall statutory architecture creates a regime with an aura 
of staid if stable orderliness while, ironically, its deeper aim is to unleash 
and enable, not constrain, proscribe, regulate, or otherwise explicitly de-
mand the pursuit of a specified moral or social outcome.  It creates legal 
space for human enterprise that may be moral or immoral but it is itself de-
cidedly amoral.  Far from curbing fallen humanity’s impulses, the meager-
ness of corporate law gives them license and legitimacy.  Corporate statutes 
are so undemanding, in fact, that one wonders whether what it creates—the 
corporation—is best understood not as a legal entity but as an amorphous 
“condition.”59 And the separate legal identity of the corporation permits 
those who stand behind it to create a sort of legal avatar, subject to their 
control, but for which they bear little responsibility.  Moreover, those em-
powered under corporate statutes—directors and officers—gain behavioral 
guidance largely from business lore, custom, and social−moral norms,60 not 
from law.  Law leaves a great deal unstated in permitting, but not itself tell-
ing, a story. 
Except, that is, for the branch of corporate justice that stems from eq-
uity.  Equity, in propounding broad standards of loyalty and care, demands 
  
 54. Genesis 3:1-6.  
 55. Id. 3:23. 
 56. The Apostle Paul’s epistle to the Romans makes this clear.  Romans 7:7 (“I 
would not have known what sin was except through the law.”). 
 57. Ephesians 2:8-9. 
 58. Galatians 4:4-5. 
 59. On the idea of a “condition”—as seen in Theodore Dreiser’s character Frank 
Cowperwood, the “Financier,” representing a “condition,” not a man—see DAVID A. 
ZIMMERMAN, PANIC!  MARKETS, CRISES, & CROWDS IN AMERICAN FICTION 194 (2006). 
 60. See Lyman Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers in Educating (Christian) 
Business Managers About Corporate Purpose 3 (Univ. of Saint Thomas Sch. of Law, Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 08-22, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract= 
1260979. 
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that directors and officers adhere to those guidelines and either moderate 
their conduct or give an account for their failings.  Equity seeks to infuse a 
moral dimension into the master narrative and redeem the corporation from 
the grip of voracious, self-serving managers seeking untoward personal 
advantage.  Equity honors the freedom accorded managers under law, but 
redirects their focus to the well-being of others, and equity strives to instill 
an element of self-sacrifice while maintaining an overall sense of financial 
fair play.61  As in the biblical narrative, innate human frailty and fallenness 
permeate human (commercial) life, unchecked, indeed facilitated, by the 
license of “law,” until a redemptive counterforce, here equity, intercedes. 
In this respect, equity subverts law,62 but necessarily so given law’s 
universality and, in the corporate arena, its extreme liberality and moral 
vapidity.  But equity itself must constantly resist subduction by the innate 
rule-orientation of law, for as Aristotle noted: “[T]he rule of the undefined 
must be itself undefined also.”63  Standards, not law’s rules, are the lingua 
franca of equity.  Two different voices, then, co-narrate the stories of corpo-
rate law. 
B.  A Moral Standard 
The overarching ethical commandment of the New Testament, the 
“Golden Rule,”64 is not a rule at all as we understand rules, but is a quintes-
  
 61. Chancellor Chandler succinctly captured these twin thrusts of freedom and con-
straint provided by the joint effort of law and equity: “[U]nder our corporate law, corporate 
decision-makers are held strictly to their fiduciary duties, but within the boundaries of those 
duties are free to act as their judgment and abilities dictate . . . .”  In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005).   
For a literary figure who embodies the raw, “natural” and relentless energy of an en-
trepreneur who resists any limits on his drive for wealth and influence, it would be hard to 
top Frank Cowperwood, the nineteenth century “financier” in Theodore Dreiser’s 1912 novel 
by that name.  THEODORE DREISER, THE FINANCIER (World Publ’g Co. 1940) (1912).  For an 
excellent discussion of Dreiser’s doubt that finance, law, or public opinion could fully bring 
to account such forces of financial nature as Cowperwood, see ZIMMERMAN, supra note 59, 
at 191-222.  Dreiser himself describes Cowperwood’s motto of “I satisfy myself” and his 
eventual “fall from grace.”  THEODORE DREISER, THE TITAN 27, 448 (WORLD PUBL’G CO. 
1925) (1914).   
 62. See HALLIWELL, supra note 11.  
 63. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 142 (Martin Ostwald trans., Bobbs-Merrill 
Co. 1962) (n.d.). 
 64. Matthew 7:12 (“[D]o to others what you would have them do to you, for this 
sums up the Law and the Prophets.”).  This is commonly known as the “Golden Rule.”  
SERMON ON THE MOUNT: EXAMINING YOUR LIFE 55 (1998).  Interestingly:  
The negative form of this rule was widely known in the ancient world:  “Do not do 
to others what you do not want them to do to you.”  Such diverse figures as Confu-
cius and the great rabbi Hillel taught this.  It is also found in Hinduism, Buddhism, 
as well as in Greek and Roman teachings.  Jesus, however, alters this statement in a 
slight but highly significant way.  He shifts this statement from the negative (“Do 
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sential standard.65  It is a standard that also acknowledges the interdepen-
dence of proper esteem for one’s self and an ethical stance toward others.  
So all-encompassing was this standard and the related command to love 
your neighbor as yourself,66 that the Apostle Paul stated about the latter that 
“he who loves his fellowman has fulfilled the law. . . .  Therefore love is the 
fulfillment of the law.”67  Of course, the New Testament articulates more 
specific rules of conduct too, but the motivational root of those rules is love, 
and one who genuinely loves will strive to engage in right conduct in all 
facets of life. 
So too, equitable commands—i.e., fiduciary duties—are not narrow 
rules but broad standards, and they are similarly all-encompassing.  Direc-
tors and officers are pervasively to act loyally, in good faith, and with due 
care.  Corporate statutes, by contrast, specify more particular and technical 
rules, but here too one who is genuinely loyal and careful will of course 
adhere to those details while also acting for the good of others (not self) in 
doing so.  Standards enjoy certain advantages over rules for the morally 
reflective and conscientious actor, and standards are central to the biblical 
and corporate counter-narratives to the master narrative—in law and life—
of humanity’s ingrained tendency to pursue self-interest. 
  
not”) to the positive (“Do”).  By so doing, he provided the world with one of the 
great (and rare) advances in moral understanding.  Whereas the negative rule was 
fulfilled by inaction (not bothering others), the positive rule requires active benevo-
lence (working for the good of others).  The law of noninterference has become the 
law of love.   
Id. 
 65. For a discussion of rules and standards, see Rock, supra note 9, at 1014 n.10 
(citing authority). 
 66. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 67. Romans 13:8-10.  See supra note 51 and accompanying text.  As Josiah Royce 
has observed, truly seeing one’s neighbor depends on a “moment of insight”: The moral 
insight is: 
The realization of one’s neighbor, in the full sense of the word realization[;] . . . the 
resolution to treat him . . . unselfishly.  But this resolution expresses and belongs to 
the moment of insight.  Passion may cloud the insight . . . after no very long time.  
It is as impossible for us to avoid the illusion of selfishness in our daily lives, as to 
escape seeing through the illusion at the moment of insight.  We see the reality of 
our neighbor, that is, we determine to treat him as we do ourselves.  But then we go 
back to daily action, and we feel the heat of hereditary passions, and we 
straightway forget what we have seen.  Our neighbor becomes obscured.  He is 
once more a foreign power.  He is unreal.  We are again deluded and selfish.  This 
conflict goes on and will go on as long as we live after the manner of men.  Mo-
ments of insight, with their accompanying resolutions; long stretches of delusion 
and selfishness:  That is our life. 
JOSIAH ROYCE, THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF PHILOSOPHY: A CRITIQUE OF THE BASES OF 
CONDUCT AND OF FAITH 155-56 (Harper & Bros. 1965) (1885). 
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C.  Apostles and Epistles 
Christ travelled in a relatively small geographic area during His 
earthly life.  But He issued a Great Commission commanding His followers 
to go out and teach all nations.68  He chose twelve Apostles for the specific 
purpose of sending them out to preach, after spending time with Him.69  The 
word “apostle” comes from the Greek “apostolos,” meaning “someone sent 
out” or “messenger.”70  In biblical use, it means the twelve men specifically 
selected by Christ,71 but it also includes such early preachers as Paul and 
Barnabas.72 
Although Christ spoke and inspired, He did not write any portion of 
the Bible.  His life and teachings were preserved by others in the four Gos-
pels, which, historically, recorded events up to the time of Christ’s resurrec-
tion and ascension.  Except for the Gospel of John, they contain many pa-
rables, because that was a favorite technique of Christ for teaching.73  A 
parable is a brief allegory with figurative meaning designed for moral in-
struction.74  The parable of the Good Samaritan,75 the parable of the Prodigal 
Son,76 and the parable of the Talents,77 are especially well known. 
  
 68. See supra note 13. 
 69. See supra notes 13, 53 and accompanying text.  
 70. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 99 (2d ed. 2001) [herei-
nafter DICTIONARY]. 
 71. Matthew 10:2-4.  One of the original twelve, Judas, betrayed Christ and died, 
and he was replaced by Matthias.  Acts 1:16, 26.  The Bible is full of such stories of disloyal-
ty and its opposite, faithfulness. 
 72. Acts 14:14.  Paul, undoubtedly the most famous apostle, was known as Saul 
prior to his dramatic conversion and calling on the road to Damascus.  Id. 9:1-16.  He strong-
ly opposed Christianity before his conversion and he zealously participated in persecuting its 
followers. 
 73. D. C. PARKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT MANUSCRIPTS AND 
THEIR TEXTS 312 (2008) (“The . . . Gospels . . . are the literary medium for the presentation 
of the teaching of Jesus.”).  J. D. Crossan has underscored in his work on parables those 
biblical passages stating Jesus spoke to the crowd only in parables.  JOHN DOMINIC CROSSAN, 
IN PARABLES: THE CHALLENGE OF THE HISTORICAL JESUS xiv (1973) (quoting Matthew 
13:30). 
 74. See DICTIONARY, supra note 70, at 1405.  Certain influential theologians, nota-
bly J. D. Crossan, have argued that those who see Jesus’ parables as clear-cut moral messag-
es are mistaken because they are, in Crossan’s view, indeterminate and contain nothing sta-
ble in meaning but are meant to subvert existing order, not impart timeless truth.  See G. J. 
Laughery, Reading Jesus’ Parables According to J. D. Crossan and P. Ricoeur, 8 EUR. J. 
THEOLOGY 145 (1999) (reviewing and critiquing Crossan and Ricoeur’s views on biblical 
parables). 
 75. Luke 10:25-37. 
 76. Id. 15:11-32. 
 77. Matthew 25:14-30. 
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The Gospels caution against legalism, as seen in Christ’s defiance of 
the rule-bound Pharisees by healing on the Sabbath,78 and in His deep com-
passion for the woman caught in adultery.79  He did not excuse legal non-
compliance,80 but insisted that it be practiced along with “the more impor-
tant matters of the law—justice, mercy and faithfulness.”81  The Gospels, 
moreover, are only one of five sections of the New Testament.  The New 
Testament also records history and the founding of the Christian Church in 
the book of Acts, which is followed by thirteen epistles authored by Paul, 
eight other epistles, and the prophetic book of Revelation. 
The word “epistle” derives from the Greek “epistole” or “epistellein,” 
meaning “to send a message.”82  As a genre, epistles in ancient times were 
widely used in secular literature, as seen, for example, in the epistles of Ho-
race, Cicero, and Seneca,83 but they were not a typical method of Jewish 
religious instruction—both Christ and Paul were Jews—in the first cen-
tury.84  The epistolary form is “especially suited for the transmission of 
knowledge or of advice.”85  In the New Testament, the epistles are a kind of 
pastoral letter to the believing community,86 written to preserve and record 
for the purpose of teaching, training, and rebuking.87  Although they are 
placed after the Gospels in the canon of the New Testament, most actually 
were written before the Gospels, though, of course, the Gospels recorded 
events that took place prior to the writing of the Epistles.  The Epistles, 
then, play a variety of roles.  They explain, teach, exhort, comfort, and pre-
scribe.  They can be quite specific as, for example, in their prescriptions for 
  
 78. Mark 3:1-5. 
 79. John 8:1-11.  Again, it was the legalists who sought Christ’s condemnation of 
the oppressed woman.  Id. This is the only instance in Scripture where Jesus writes.  He 
wrote something on the ground with his finger that was not recorded.  Id. 
 80. He told the woman caught in adultery not to sin any more, even though he did 
not then condemn her.  Id. 8:11. 
 81. Matthew 23:23. 
 82. DICTIONARY, supra note 70, at 654.  
 83. See, e.g., THE SATIRES AND EPISTLES OF HORACE (Smith Palmer Bovie, trans., 
1959); ANCIENT LETTERS: CLASSICAL AND LATE ANTIQUE EPISTOLOGRAPHY 157 (Ruth Morel-
lo & A. D. Morrison eds., 2007) [hereinafter Morello & Morrison]. 
 84. D. A. CARSON & DOUGLAS J. MOO, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT 
331 (2d ed. 2005). 
 85. Morello and Morrison, supra note 83, at viii.  
 86. The two epistles to Timothy and the one to Titus, however, were addressed to 
particular individuals.  It was expected, nonetheless, that they would be shared more broadly 
within the community of believers.  
 87. 2 Timothy 3:16.  Professors Carson and Moo suggest that Paul used letters be-
cause it was convenient and necessary, given the rapid growth of Christianity, for communi-
cating from a distance.  And also for their sense of “personal immediacy,” that is, as “a 
means of establishing personal presence from a distance.”  Carson and Moo, supra note 84, 
at 331. 
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handling disputes88 and orderly worship,89 but they also recurrently include 
calls for adherence to such overarching standards as kindness, patience, 
faithfulness, and self-control.90  The Epistles do not so much create as un-
fold and reveal.  They are central to the beliefs and practices of the Christian 
Church.91 
If Professor Rock is correct that Delaware courts issue sermons and 
parables, then those opinions serve as authoritative “gospel” for corporate 
law.  And lawyers, law professors, and law students rightly give them the 
close and careful study that theologians and conscientious clergy and lay 
readers give the Bible.  But, although the Bible is accessible to all who can 
read, and in fact is widely read by clergy and lay believers around the 
world, it is quite unlikely that corporate directors and officers read judicial 
opinions, at least not frequently.  Professor Rock does not fully grapple with 
this problem.  He states, for example: “Consider how Evans, Reilly, or 
Wasserstein felt when reading these opinions.”92  Softening the transmis-
sion-of-law point somewhat, he also states: “Imagine how other managers 
and directors, when they read or heard about these opinions, felt about the 
prospect of being similarly pilloried.”93  If managers in fact are reading judi-
cial opinions about fiduciary duties, that would be extraordinarily helpful 
for the project of disseminating legal knowledge, but that seems improba-
ble.  Where, then, in the re-telling of corporate law’s morally laden counter-
narrative, are the apostles, and what are they saying in their epistles to the 
corporate community?  That question will be explored in Part IV, after Part 
III examines a recent, well-known and highly instructive sermon from De-
laware—the Disney opinion. 
III.  THE DISNEY NARRATIVE AND COUNTER-NARRATIVE 
Few cases in corporate law over the past decade have been as long-
awaited and as closely scrutinized as the trial court opinion in In re The 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation.94  After an attention-grabbing pretrial 
order in 2003 refused to dismiss a complaint alleging breaches of the fidu-
ciary duty of good faith,95 the case went to trial in late 2004.  Chancellor 
  
 88. See 1 Corinthians 6:1-8. 
 89. See 1 Corinthians 14:26-40.  
 90. Galatians 5:22-23. 
 91. James W. Aageson, PAUL, THE PASTORAL EPISTLES, AND THE EARLY CHURCH 1 
(2008) (“What is virtually indisputable is that Paul and his letters, during his lifetime and 
after, played a critical role in making Christianity what it was to become.”).  
 92. Rock, supra note 9, at 1048.  Those gentlemen had been strongly chided in the 
opinions described earlier by Rock. 
 93. Id. (emphasis added). 
 94. 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).  
 95. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 291 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
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William Chandler found for the defendants in handing down his lengthy 
opinion in August 2005, the culmination to what the Chancellor described 
as “something of a public spectacle.”96  In June 2006, the Delaware Su-
preme Court affirmed Chancellor Chandler’s decision.97 
The Disney Company, of course, is a household name famous for its 
fictional characters like Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, Dumbo, Bambi, Cin-
derella, and many others, and for its original effort to provide wholesome 
entertainment for the entire family.  Disney owns theme parks, a movie stu-
dio, and television properties including ABC, ESPN, and the Disney Chan-
nel.  The basic facts of the Disney litigation itself are well known to corpo-
rate law readers, so only a summary is needed here.   
The legal issue centered on whether the directors and certain executive 
officers of Disney had breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the 
hiring and termination of Michael Ovitz as president.  Ovitz was the founder 
and head of Hollywood’s most powerful talent agency.  He was courted for 
the number-two position by Michael Eisner, Disney’s CEO, following a 
period of considerable turmoil at Disney.  The prior president, Frank Wells, 
had died in a helicopter crash.  Eisner himself had a serious heart condition 
requiring surgery, and the company had just acquired Capital Cities/ABC, a 
very significant expansion.  However, once Ovitz took over as president of 
the Disney Company, he served for only about fourteen months, yet he re-
ceived approximately $130 million in severance compensation.  Many 
shareholders were upset and brought a derivative action in which they as-
serted breaches of the fiduciary duties of due care and good faith in the way 
the Disney directors and officers had handled Ovitz’s hiring and termina-
tion. 
At the trial, which consumed thirty-seven days, several Disney offic-
ers and directors took the witness stand to give their own versions of what 
had happened in the Ovitz affair.  They told their story directly to Chandler.  
He observed their demeanor and listened to their accounts firsthand, unlike 
appellate judges who receive witness testimony secondhand from a written 
record.  The defendants’ lawyers understandably sought to portray their 
clients as saintly—or at least as not too sinful—while opposing counsel 
drew out the villainy or ineptitude in their behavior.  Assessing these mul-
tiple vantage points, Chancellor Chandler pieced together “the facts” as he 
found them and wove them into a master narrative told only by him.   
Recall that corporate statutes permit a business story but do not them-
selves tell it.98  Consequently, prior to the litigation, the Disney/Ovitz story 
had substantially played out factually, but had not yet come into the legal 
light.  Chandler’s narrative not only painstakingly and coherently ordered 
  
 96. 907 A.2d at 698. 
 97. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006). 
 98. See supra INTRODUCTION. 
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the key events and characters to make sense of what had happened at Dis-
ney, it formed the essential backdrop for framing and interjecting his equit-
able counter-narrative.  Equity’s moralizing counter-narrative is thus com-
plicit in, even as it engages and recasts, the often tragic-comic master narra-
tive permitted by lax law and fallen man.99 
Of course, one of the delicious ironies of the encounter between the 
master narrative and the counter-narrative in Disney is that most of the de-
fendants—except Ovitz himself—thought all along that the problem at Dis-
ney was Ovitz.  After being wooed by Eisner and signing a lucrative em-
ployment agreement that, at Ovitz’s insistence, presciently covered a possi-
ble abrupt departure, the tale of Ovitz told by Eisner and others was that 
Ovitz and Disney were a mismatch of cultures, personality, and work styles.  
Director Gary Wilson testified, for example, that “there was a problem of 
Mr. Ovitz being accepted into the organization.”100  Shareholders—cast as 
always in the role of Plaintiffs—alleged other impropriety by Ovitz, such as 
supposed lying and violations of Disney’s gift policies, but these and other 
charges were given short shrift by the Chancellor.   
Overall, Chandler’s rendering of the Ovitz affair is not unsympathetic 
to Ovitz.  He noted, for example, that “Ovitz did make some valuable con-
tributions while President of the Company.”101  Chandler also cast Ovitz 
somewhat as the classic “outsider” who did not fit into the foreign culture to 
which he had migrated, and who was somewhat shabbily treated by many of 
those elite habitués already inside the power structure at Disney.  Like the 
new kid at a swank and cliquish Beverly Hills 90210 high school with the 
wrong clothes, car, and manner, the veteran, hard-edged Hollywood agent 
moved clumsily about in the more mannered corporate America he had fre-
quently fought but never inhabited.  The outcome of Ovitz’s short-lived tale 
at Disney was eventually one of rejection and banishment.102  Whether he 
fell by his own sin or that of others, he was thrown out of the Magic King-
dom.   
  
 99. The interaction of statutory law and equity thus responds to Mae Kuykendall’s 
claim that “[c]orporate law will benefit from a guiding framework that proposes a narrative 
structure for a socially embodied set of stories about the sort of people who inhabit the cor-
porate world, both the concrete setting and the legal constructs.”  Mae Kuykendall, Comment 
on Kostant:  Tune in to Hear Stories of Corporate Governance, the Adventures of the Go-
Between and More Exciting Tales of Corporate Law, 28 J. SOCIO-ECON. 259, 263 (1999).  
The “guiding framework” is co-produced by two different voices, the one enabled by legisla-
tures and the other expressed directly by courts, one offering freedom and another restraint, 
and each resting on the other. 
 100. 907 A.2d at 714. 
 101. Id. at 716. 
 102. Ovitz himself described his termination as having been “cut out like cancer.”  
And, “I guess you could say I got pushed out the sixth-floor window.”  Kim Christensen & 
Richard Verrier, Judge Rules in Favor of Disney in Ovitz Case But Criticizes Eisner, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2005, at A1. 
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As it happens, however, from a corporate law standpoint the issue in 
the Disney case was not, ultimately, Ovitz’s behavior, but, instead, that of 
the directors and certain officers in hiring and firing Ovitz.  Having con-
cluded that Ovitz’s conduct was lacking (but not “faulty” under the terms of 
his employment agreement), Eisner and the other insiders found their own 
conduct under attack at trial.  They, not Ovitz, held the reins of power con-
ferred by the corporate law statute,103 so it was they who would be judged in 
the Chancellor’s counter-narrative. 
In a lengthy opinion, Chandler concluded that none of the defendants 
had breached their fiduciary duties.  Nonetheless, the opinion was a paragon 
of how Rock had earlier described Delaware opinions.104  It was detailed, 
normatively saturated, judgmental, and laced with scolding, sometimes 
acerbic, moral reproof.  In the Introduction alone, Chandler used the moral-
ly laden word “stewardship” to describe fiduciary standards,105 and five 
times in the space of two pages, he used the word “faithful” or “faithfully,” 
once employing the biblical phrase “faithful servant[].”106 
The opinion is replete with morally freighted phrasings.  For example, 
he described a portion of General Counsel Litvack’s testimony as “pathet-
ic.”107  He characterized a joint appearance on the Larry King Show by 
Eisner and Ovitz as a “shameless public relations move.”108  A press release 
concerning Ovitz’s departure was “either a deliberate untruth or an incredi-
bly irresponsible and sloppy error.”109  Chandler recounted that “the Disney 
directors had been taken for a wild ride, and most of it was in the dark.”110  
He also referred to the “board’s collective kowtowing . . . [and] Eisner’s 
desire to surround himself with yes men. . . . who would have sycophantic 
tendencies.”111 
  
 103. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 104. See supra notes 19-33 and accompanying text. 
 105. 907 A.2d at 697. 
 106. Id. at 697-98.  See Matthew 25:21 (“Well done, good and faithful servant!”). 
 107. 907 A.2d at 777. 
 108. Id. at 726. 
 109. Id. at 735. 
 110. Id. at 736. 
 111. Id. at 761 n.488.  Novelist Anthony Trollope presciently captured the low level 
at which many corporate directors often operate in dialogue in his 1875 book, THE WAY WE 
LIVE NOW:  
Paul [in responding to a question asked by Lord Nidderdale]: “I didn’t mean to be 
savage, but I think that as we call ourselves Directors we ought to know something 
about it.” 
 
Lord Nidderdale: “I suppose we ought.  I don’t know, you know.  I’ll tell you what 
I’ve been thinking.  I can’t make out why the mischief they made me a Director.”   
ANTHONY TROLLOPE, THE WAY WE LIVE NOW 240 (London, Chapman and Hall 1875).  
Many shareholders continue to wonder “why the mischief” certain people ended up as direc-
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Most memorable and biting, however, were three highly critical depic-
tions of Eisner and his relationship to the Disney board.112  Chandler por-
trayed the “unwholesome boardroom culture at Disney . . . [where] orna-
mental, passive directors contribute to sycophantic tendencies among direc-
tors and . . . imperial CEOs can exploit this condition.”113  Continuing this 
“imperial” CEO theme, Chandler’s portrayal of Eisner brings to mind Trol-
lope’s description of his iniquitous character, Melmotte—a nineteenth cen-
tury Bernie Madoff—“whose arrogance in the midst of his inflated glory 
was overcoming him.”114  Chandler thus described Eisner’s “Machiavellian 
(and imperial) nature as CEO . . . [and] failings in process that infected and 
handicapped the board’s decisionmaking abilities.  Eisner stacked his (and I 
intentionally wrote ‘his’ as opposed to ‘the Company’s’) board of directors  
. . . .”115  And in the crowning depiction of Eisner’s renowned narcissism,116 
he was described as having “enthroned himself as the omnipotent and infal-
lible monarch of his personal Magic Kingdom.”117 
Chandler made explicit his awareness that the opinion did not simply 
resolve a single corporate dispute but would be mined for its application to 
other boards and other CEOs: “[T]he Opinion may serve as guidance for 
future officers and directors—not only of The Walt Disney Company, but of 
other Delaware corporations.”118  And: “For the future, many lessons of 
what not to do can be learned from defendants’ conduct here.”119  Like a 
good preacher, Chandler urged his parishioners to learn from the wayward-
ness of others and strive to live a more decent and upright life.  To do this 
most effectively, Eisner necessarily emerged, in Chandler’s account, as an 
emblem, a personification of the vanity and breakdown to be avoided in a 
healthy corporate culture.  In Chandler’s storytelling hands, Eisner became 
another of the well-known Disney characters, not imaginary or especially 
wholesome, however, but all too real and deeply flawed. 
Regrettably, many a humdinger of a fire and brimstone homily is 
quickly forgotten over Sunday’s pot roast.  But Chandler published his ser-
mon, preserving its text for return study.  The genre of corporate law opi-
  
tors, at Disney and elsewhere, notwithstanding the legal requirement of a shareholder vote.  
In honesty, perhaps many of those same directors, like Lord Nidderdale, likewise wonder. 
 112. Rock distills from Delaware’s opinions other examples of colorful, condemnato-
ry language aimed at villainous conduct.  Rock, supra note 9, at 1047.  
 113. In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 741 n.373.  See also id. at 760 n.487.  
 114. TROLLOPE, supra note 111, at 288. 
 115. 907 A.2d at 760.  The Chancellor’s use of the word “infected” invokes a meta-
phor of disease. 
 116. See Jayne W. Barnard, Narcissism, Over-Optimism, Fear, Anger, and Depres-
sion: The Interior Lives of Corporate Leaders, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 412 (2008) (describing 
Eisner as a “legendary narcissist” and citing several specific instances).  
 117. 907 A.2d at 763. 
 118. Id. at 698. 
 119. Id. at 760. 
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nions is not a literary best seller, however, and so neither the public at large 
nor directors of public companies are likely to read the full-blown origi-
nal.120  The probable readers are journalists, corporate lawyers, law profes-
sors, and law students.  Journalists for their subscribing public, and corpo-
rate lawyers for their clients, must mediate and translate what the judge said 
into understandable and helpful terms.  Do the press and corporate clerisy 
accurately and fully convey to their audiences the strong moral refrain suf-
fusing Chandler’s opinion–sermon, or is that quality lost in the re-telling? 
IV.  APOSTLES AND EPISTLES 
A.  Methodology 
The obvious messengers—apostles—of Delaware’s opinions on fidu-
ciary duties, such as that in Disney, are journalists at big-city newspapers 
and lawyers at elite corporate law firms, each of which like to report “break-
ing news.”  The media by which these messages—epistles—are sent, there-
fore, include newspaper stories and law firm memos. 
As to newspapers, the author examined reports of Chancellor Chand-
ler’s opinion in The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and The Los 
Angeles Times for August 10, 2005, the day following release of the opi-
nion.  As to elite law firm accounts, Professor Rock rightly notes that it is 
hard to get a clear handle on what law firms actually say to clients in corpo-
rate boardrooms, for a variety of reasons.121  He suggests examining the 
unexplored genre of the “memorandum to our clients.”122  That is one possi-
bility, but another more accessible avenue is to examine law firm postings 
on their websites.  Not only are these more prevalent than when Rock wrote 
in 1997, websites are efficient ways for firms to promptly communicate 
with existing clients.  Law firm websites convey to actual and potential 
clients a clear sense that the firm is au courant on the latest legal develop-
ments and can offer immediate and insightful analysis of their significance.  
Consequently, the author examined the websites of twelve elite corporate 
law firms to see what they said about the Disney opinion.123  The website is 
  
 120. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.  Interestingly, an editorial in 
London’s Financial Times newspaper stated: “Directors on both sides of the Atlantic should 
make it their duty to read all 174 pages [of the Disney opinion].”  Michael Newman, Edito-
rials Elsewhere: A Very Popular Opinion, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2005, at B12. 
 121. Rock, supra note 9, at 1070 & n.166. 
 122. Id. at 1070. 
 123. The twelve law firms were: Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld; Cadwalader, 
Wickershaw & Taft; Davis Polk & Wardwell; Dorsey & Whitney; Fulbright & Jaworski; 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher; Hunton & Williams; Morrison & Foerster; Potter, Anderson & 
Corroon; Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; and Weil, 
Gotshal & Manges. 
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itself an interesting genre in the elite law firm setting.  A “visitor” to the 
sites may read, free of charge, legal analyses seemingly intended for firm 
clients.  In this respect, as with the literary form of letters generally, the 
reader is afforded the eavesdropping “sense of privileged access to a private 
world.”124 
Before describing the findings, it is worth recalling that Chandler an-
ticipated that his opinion would serve as guidance for “future officers and 
directors.”125  He also noted, citing one of this author’s articles, that the 
plaintiffs had not differentiated between officers and directors in their 
theory of liability.126  This lawyering failure reflects a distressing pattern in 
the law of fiduciary duties of simply lumping officers and directors togeth-
er.127  Moreover, recent empirical work suggests lawyers do not do an espe-
cially good job of advising corporate officers as to their duties.128  Inside 
counsel appear to do a better job than outside counsel,129 but even general 
counsel fall down in some respects.  For example, fewer than half of all 
respondents in a recent survey reported that they advise officers below the 
level of CEO and CFO.130  Thus, in terms of the current Article, lawyers 
appear not to be effective missionaries to corporate officers.  Those most 
powerful corporate actors, then, those with the greatest legal, and perhaps 
personal, potential for sin and villainy, and so those most in need of a peri-
odic call to redemption, are the least likely to hear judicial guidance from 
corporate lawyers. 
B.  Bearing Witness to Directors 
1.  Newspaper Reports 
All three newspapers used strong words to characterize Chandler’s re-
proach of Eisner and the Disney board.  The Los Angeles Times stated, va-
riously, that the Chancellor had “rebuked,” “scolded,” “lambasted,” and 
  
One lawyer has told the author that he thinks firm websites are self-promoting.  
That is undoubtedly true, but that portion of these firms’ web sites devoted to legal analysis 
is professionally quite impressive, and, moreover, there is no reason for even a self-
promoting website to inaccurately describe legal materials. 
 124. Morrello & Morrison, supra note 83, at xi. 
 125. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005) 
(emphasis added).  
 126. Id. at 777-78 n.588.  
 127. See generally Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate 
Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005). 
 128. See generally Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert V. Ricca, (Not) Advising Corpo-
rate Officers About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663 (2007). 
 129. See generally Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised 
About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS. LAW. 1105 (2009).  
 130. Id. 
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“chided” Eisner and the directors, and had made “bristling comments” about 
them.131  The Wall Street Journal’s account stated that the judge at times 
had “chastised” the board and Eisner, and “did rebuke” them.132  The New 
York Times stated that Chandler had “chided” the directors and “offered 
pointed criticism” of Eisner and the board.133 
All three newspapers included Chandler’s crowning passage that Eisn-
er had “enthroned himself as the omnipotent and infallible monarch of his 
personal Magic Kingdom.”134  All three newspapers also included the unflat-
tering description of Eisner as “Machiavellian,”135 with two of the three 
quoting the entire passage in which that word appeared.  The term “Machia-
vellian,” of course, is a strongly negative descriptor, meaning cunning, 
scheming, and unscrupulous.136  It is customarily reserved for especially 
reprehensible and calculating behavior.  Two of the three papers conveyed 
the “imperial CEO” descriptor.137  The New York Times report included 
Chandler’s passage that Eisner had “stacked his . . . board,”138 and the L.A. 
Times quoted the judge’s description of the Larry King interview as a 
“shameless public relations move” and his description of the whole affair as 
“a public spectacle.”139 
These three major newspapers, with a combined circulation number-
ing in the millions and likely a far larger readership, clearly conveyed intact 
the strongest and most morally judgmental language from the Chancellor’s 
opinion.  This was evident not only by inclusion of the descriptors and pas-
sages noted above, but also in their overall tone, although that interpretation 
is more subjective.  These twenty-first century newspapers seem to be doing 
what novelist Theodore Dreiser described in his essay “Ideals, Morals, and 
the Daily Newspaper.”140  Dreiser loftily observed that newspapers did what 
preachers once had done, serving as “guardians of all phases of virtue, ho-
nesty and the like.”141  He noted that in advocating “moral self-control, pub-
  
 131. Christensen & Verrier, supra note 102, at A1. 
 132. Bruce Orwall & Merissa Marr, Judge Backs Disney Directors in Suit on Ovitz’s 
Hiring, Firing, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2005, at A1.  
 133. Laura M. Holson, Ruling Upholds Disney’s Payment in Firing of Ovitz, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2005, at A1. 
 134. Christensen & Verrier, supra note 102, at A1; Orwall & Marr, supra note 132, at 
A1; Holson, supra note 133, at A1.  See also supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.  
 135. Christensen & Verrier, supra note 102, at A1; Orwall & Marr, supra note 132, at 
A1; Holson, supra note 133, at A1. 
 136. See THE OXFORD POCKET DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH, available at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/10999-machiavellian.html. 
 137. Christensen & Verrier, supra note 102, at A1; Holson, supra note 133, at A1. 
 138. Holson, supra note 133, at A1. 
 139. Christensen & Verrier, supra note 102, at A1. 
 140. THEODORE DREISER, Ideals, Morals, and the Daily Newspaper, in HEY RUB-A-
DUB-DUB: A BOOK OF THE MYSTERY AND WONDER AND TERROR OF LIFE 152 (1920). 
 141. Id. 
868 Michigan State Law Review [Vol. 2009:847 
lic and private,” newspapers expressed the civic ideals of the “average 
man.”142  Dreiser’s language may be a bit overblown but it seems to accu-
rately capture how three major newspapers reported the judge’s sermon in 
Disney. 
2.  Law Firm Reports 
What do elite law firms say about the Disney trial court opinion?  Just 
as many corporate lawyers appear not to spend much time advising officers 
about their duties,143 it appears, based on a review of their websites, that 
many elite law firms said little or nothing about this important ruling.  Pos-
sibly, of course, the website archives had been purged of the material, but 
many of the sites still contained information from the same or earlier pe-
riods.  These same firms also could have conveyed information about the 
Disney decision to their clients by other means.  Still, given these firms’ 
regular use of their websites to communicate recent legal developments, the 
lack of any reference to a case as significant as Disney is striking. 
Many leading law firms, however, did post summary descriptions of 
the Disney opinion.  The websites of twelve elite firms that did so were re-
viewed to see what they reported about Chandler’s ruling,144 with particular 
attention being given to how they characterized the Chancellor’s criticisms 
of Eisner and the board, and whether the firms fully conveyed the language 
of moral denunciation used by Chandler.  All of the examined websites, it 
should be noted, did a thorough job of reporting certain matters.  They 
stated that the directors had prevailed and incurred no liability; that the 
business judgment rule retained its central role in judicial analysis of direc-
tor conduct; described the court’s explanation of how the obligation of good 
faith related to the duties of care and loyalty; and offered practical points for 
corporate directors to draw from the opinion for the future. 
Also, the twelve reports uniformly noted that Chandler had leveled 
criticisms at the behavior of Eisner and the other directors, frequently using 
the words “criticize” or “criticism.”  Unlike the three newspaper accounts, 
however, which all had used somewhat tougher—and more accurate, in this 
author’s view—language such as “chastised,” “scolded,” “chided,” “lam-
basted,” and others, only one firm—Potter, Anderson & Corroon145—used 
such language in describing Chandler’s “chastising” of the directors.   
  
 142. Id. 
 143. See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra note 123. 
 145. Potter, Anderson & Corroon was the only law firm of the twelve that was in-
volved as counsel in the Disney litigation.  The firm represented Sanford Litvack, Disney’s 
General Counsel. 
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The reports were less likely than the newspapers to convey or quote 
Chandler’s harshest comments.  Only one firm quoted the crowning “Magic 
Kingdom” comment and only one firm (a different one) quoted the striking 
description of Eisner as “Machiavellian.”  Two firms described Chandler’s 
view that Eisner had taken the directors on a “wild ride.”  One firm used 
Chandler’s “kowtowing” description.  However, eight of the twelve firms 
reported the “imperial CEO” description of Eisner, and six conveyed at least 
one of the Chancellor’s descriptions of the Disney directors as “ornamental” 
or “sycophantic” or “supine.”  Three of those same firms plus an additional 
three—a total of six firms—conveyed the idea of a “stacked” board at Dis-
ney, but four of those deleted most of the entire phrase,146 thereby losing its 
full critical thrust, especially Chandler’s derisive “his board” parentheti-
cal.147 
Three firms conveyed none of the Chancellor’s three most critical pas-
sages.  Four firms included three or more of the most scolding passages 
from the opinion, and one firm seems to have used every such passage ex-
cept the term “Machiavellian.” 
Several observations can be made.  Obviously, twelve firms is not a 
large sample size.  Nonetheless, these firms are, by anyone’s standards, 
elite, high-quality law firms and likely would do a good job of accurately 
capturing what corporate lawyers think the Disney opinion did.  Broadening 
the sample size may or may not show further weakness in capturing the 
moral flavor of the opinion.  Also, these reports are not meant to be scholar-
ly articles and are written fairly hurriedly, one surmises, but the same is true 
of next-day newspaper articles.  Again, moreover, these are elite law firms, 
accustomed to absorbing and summarizing legal materials quite quickly.  
And they are fully conversant with the corporate law concepts at play and 
surely appreciate the significance of Chancery Court rulings, especially one 
as long awaited and momentous as Disney. 
All that being said, it is clear that these law firm reports, varied as they 
are, overall are more likely than newspapers to “tone down” the opinion’s 
harshest language.  Of course, the firms may be passing along the Chancel-
lor’s moral reproach via some means other than their websites, such as 
through client-specific correspondence or oral advice.  Or, perhaps the firms 
believe that the news accounts already have done that, so why repeat it?  
Alternatively, they may not think the moral rebuke is important, regarding it 
as just a sort of judicial “blowing off steam” with no larger significance for 
the counseling of their clients.  They might think the key role for them is to 
  
 146. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 147. Id.  
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distill and transmit the opinion’s practical pointers—the “dos” and 
“don’ts”—for future boardroom conduct.148 
This last view is open to challenge, however.  The moral disapproval 
expressed in a court of equity’s opinion is a key feature of it.  Former Chan-
cellor William Allen has written, for example, that corporate directors are 
“members of moral communities with allegiances to moral codes.”149  He 
also has noted that “we would be badly wrong to think that knowledge of 
legal rules is all that we need to understand the legal world.”150  Further-
more, judges are among the very few persons in our society with the moral 
and legal authority to warn and exhort corporate elites.  To be useful for 
instruction, however, the judicial message somehow must be communicated 
to members of those moral communities. 
A Chancery Court opinion, moreover—like a sermon, song, or story—
has a “tone,” a “melody,” as well as words and a particular ending.  Anyone 
who has been severely scolded and let off the hook remembers the scolding, 
as does anyone witnessing another person on the wrong end of a good dress-
ing down.  Not to report that event in a way that fully captures the speaker’s 
attitudes is to misreport by omission what really happened; translating by 
deletion is not re-telling.  The Disney opinion was not crafted at great length 
merely to explain why the directors were being let off the legal hook.  It was 
written to communicate disapproval with past performance and to convey a 
clear expectation of better conduct in the future, Chancellor Chandler per-
haps being fully mindful that equity’s demands were not especially onerous 
and needed bolstering with rhetorical fervor.  The opinion therefore, as do 
parables generally, employed certain jarring images and colorful terms to 
compose this counter-narrative of judicial reproof and path to redemption.  
The upbraiding, moreover, was not intended only for Eisner’s and the other 
Disney directors’ burning ears.  The deterrence sought by a preacher’s or 
judge’s rebuke is, like that of a parent with more than one child, general in 
its thrust, not “special” and limited to the edification only of the wayward.   
This is not to say that “pointers” and “tips” and “rules” do not matter.  
Of course they do.  The danger is that compliance with them is wrongly 
thought to fully discharge one’s duties.  A specification of particular beha-
viors to adopt or avoid in order to be a “careful” or “loyal” director is useful 
  
 148. My colleague David Millon thinks these lawyers are serving more as “transla-
tors” than “retellers,” as they translate equity’s principles into practical pointers. 
 149. See William T. Allen, The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duty of Care and the 
Business Judgment Rule Under U.S. Corporate Law, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 307, 330 (Klaus J. Hopt et 
al. eds., 1998) (emphasis omitted). 
 150. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 278 (1992).  Allen goes on to observe that “if we were to learn the 
content of legal rules alone we would achieve only a dry and brittle power that would quickly 
snap under the dynamic cross-pressures of complex and contradictory real life.”  Id. 
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by way of example and illustration, but specific instances of a category 
(“loyalty” or “care”), although cognitively helpful, do not (and cannot) ex-
haust the breadth of those qualities any more than literally complying with 
every traffic rule makes one a “safe” driver.  Loyalty and care not only are 
open-ended standards, not rules, they are attributes of a particular disposi-
tion of the actor.151  Loyal and careful behavior is more likely to result from 
a director who, through cogent remembrance, recalls that he or she must 
habitually “be” loyal and careful as a matter of course, not just episodically.  
The poet W. H. Auden links teaching to parables by noting: “You cannot 
tell people what to do, you can only tell them parables.”152 
Chandler fully anticipated that his opinion would be read or at least 
heard about.153  His predecessor, Chancellor William Allen, similarly be-
lieved that a famous opinion he wrote—Caremark154—also would be read 
and  
[W]ould change directors’ behavior through its simple statement that directors 
have a duty to oversee legal compliance.  Chancellor Allen believed that Care-
mark’s standard of conduct could change behavior, notwithstanding its narrow 
standard of review, because he believed that directors generally want to satisfy 
their legal duties. . . .  Chancellor Allen believed that Caremark[] . . . would alter 
directors’ behavior through its moral suasion and associated impact on directors’ 
norms.155 
Neither Chandler nor Allen, however, seems explicitly to have consi-
dered the critical issue of exactly how their “moral suasion” would be 
communicated to directors.156  No doubt they knew their immediate reader-
  
 151. Johnson, After Enron, supra note 42, at 47-55.  Moreover, as philosopher J. L. 
Stocks had noted, moral claims are not the same as policy claims as they call an actor to 
“surrender” what rightly may seem to be his: 
[T]he claims of morality, as they operate in human life, present on the face of it a 
very different appearance from the claims of policy or purpose.  They come as a 
recognized obligation to do or not to do, which is often seen to involve the tempo-
rary surrender or restriction of a desire in itself innocent, of a perfectly legitimate 
purpose.  All serious moralists have had to recognize this very obvious and familiar 
contrast. 
J. L. STOCKS, MORALITY AND PURPOSE 73 (D.Z. Phillips ed., 1969). 
 152. MONROE K. SPEARS, THE POETRY OF W. H. AUDEN: THE DISENCHANTED ISLAND 
13 (1963) (quoting W.H. Auden, Psychology and Art Today (1935)).  See Crossan, supra 
note 73, at xiv (describing how Jesus taught the crowd only by parables). 
 153. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text. 
 154. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).  
 155. Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis–Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone: Directors’ 
Evolving Duty to Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323, 341-42 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 
2009). 
 156. This problem is not rectified by the fact that, as Delaware Chief Justice Myron 
Steele has noted, Delaware’s judges write articles and give speeches, and participate in poli-
cymaking bodies like the ABA.  Myron T. Steele & J. W. Verret, Delaware’s Guidance: 
Ensuring Equity for the Modern Witenagemot, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 189 (2007).  Most of 
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ship was lawyers, even though the ultimate audience was directors and of-
ficers themselves.  As effective promulgation is an essential aspect of the 
Rule of Law,157 the teachings of equity must be appropriately transmitted to 
corporate decision-makers whose conduct will be authoritatively assessed 
by reference to them.  This means the evocative re-telling of these stories is 
critical to achieving the didactic aim of the first telling.  The language of 
moral suasion is different—it is sharper and more convicting—than the ob-
jective transmittal of a recipe or a formula or a rule.  Conveying that key 
language from the original narrator is crucial for a faithful re-telling and, 
from there, to altered behavior. 
We in law too infrequently think about how (or whether) law is ever 
communicated beyond lawyers and truly promulgated to the public at large 
or, at least, to key sectors of society.  To the extent common law is rooted in 
shared social norms158—indeed Lon Fuller described law as “the enterprise 
of subjecting human behavior to the governance of rules”159—judicial rul-
ings may reflect beliefs already held by large numbers of people.  Thus, 
Delaware’s judges can continue to demand loyalty and care because those 
qualities are presumably still valued, and perhaps more or less compre-
hended, in both the corporate and broader social arenas.  But even if these 
underlying norms are already understood in these particular social settings 
(the boardroom and executive suite), failure to use moral language to pe-
riodically underscore these norms can lead to an eventual withering of these 
essential qualities.160  Silence on certain points itself communicates; it com-
municates a lack of significance.   
Law as a positivist system of social rules generally may enjoy signifi-
cant autonomy from the domain of morality as such.161  And therefore spe-
cialists—judges and lawyers—trained in the form, techniques, and lexicon 
of legal analysis, understandably emphasize the rules aspect of positive law.  
  
the readers, listeners, and co-participants in these settings are lawyers.  Only where judges 
speak directly to directors and officers—something that occurs but is rarer—is the mediative 
role of lawyers bypassed.  Perhaps Delaware’s judges should “go public” more often. 
 157. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 49 (rev. ed. 1969). 
 158. This subject is very ably treated by Melvin Eisenberg.  MELVIN ARON 
EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 14-42 (1988) (describing the influence of 
“social propositions” on doctrine).  For an elaboration of how social norms undergird corpo-
rate law doctrine, see Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corpo-
rate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865 (1990). 
 159. FULLER, supra note 157, at 124. 
 160. Sociologist Alan Wolfe believes corporate America already has squandered its 
reserve of loyalty.  “Of all the virtues presumed to have been lost in America, loyalty gener-
ally takes pride of place. . . . No other institution . . . provokes such bittersweet reflections of 
loyalty lost as the business corporation.”  ALAN WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM: THE SEARCH FOR 
VIRTUE IN A WORLD OF CHOICE 23-26 (2001). 
 161. Robert P. George, What Is Law?  A Century of Arguments, FIRST THINGS, Apr. 
2001, at 23, 29. 
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But law also, and fiduciary duty law in particular, although cultural arti-
facts, nonetheless are grounded in principles “of great moral worth brought 
into being largely for moral purposes.”162  Consequently, the moral tenor of 
fiduciary duty law forms an essential aspect of positive law.  This means 
that authoritative voices—those of leading corporate lawyers—must fully 
re-tell the story.163  If not, then the redemptive role of equity’s counter-
narrative in resisting the master narrative impelled by lax law and human 
frailty is, in the two-fold design of corporate law, inevitably nudged into the 
background by legal elites. 
CONCLUSION 
Business stories, large and small, visible and invisible, play out across 
this nation and throughout the world every day.  These stories are shaped by 
the personal make-up and goals of the managers, and by business lore, so-
cial norms, training, fortune and misfortune, and market constraints.  Few of 
these stories will ever show up in court,164 or be widely told.165  Corporate 
law’s role initially appears limited to statutorily “under-writing” the story 
by offering the many attractive features of the corporate form, including 
broad freedom coupled with a reduced exposure to personal liability.  But 
equity’s counter-narrative, which seems in a litigated case like Disney to 
intervene only later in the larger narrative, in fact stands ready to speak its 
influence from the very start.  Its insistence on loyalty and care is meant to 
guide the master plotline all along in every story. 
The dazzling freedom afforded business characters in corporate sta-
tutes would be unlikely and highly problematic without the inhibitory 
“counter” voice of equity.  Equity embeds something of a moral infrastruc-
  
 162. Id. 
 163. What is being urged in the text—accurately and fully retelling what equity says 
about fiduciary duty—is distinct from advocating that lawyers provide “moral counsel” as 
such, see Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2006), or 
that lawyers have a “civic obligation” to impart full counsel, see Bruce A. Green & Russell 
G. Pearce, “Public Service Must Begin at Home”: The Lawyer as Civics Teacher in Every-
day Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207 (2009).  The claim here is more straightforward.  
To accurately convey factually what Delaware’s judges have done in an opinion and to accu-
rately convey factually what director and officer fiduciary duties entail, the moral dimension 
of both must be communicated. 
 164. See Arlen, supra note 155; THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW (Jonathan R. 
Macey ed., 2008).  The stories in these two collections are all litigated stories, almost all of 
which, except Chancellor Chandler’s opinion in Disney, are told from the vantage point of 
appellate judges.  See James D. Cox & Eric Talley, Hope and Despair in the Magic King-
dom: In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation (Berkeley Program in Law and 
Economics, Working Paper Series, May 2008), available at 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/7j44n7wf. 
 165. See supra note 2. 
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ture into the otherwise meager contours of corporate law in order to endow 
business activity with an element of moral endeavor.  But equity “counters” 
the master narrative—explicitly, in those cases that do show up in court—
for the purpose of more generally co-producing the larger business narra-
tive, not just periodically opposing it.  The judicial speakers in this ostensi-
bly counter-discourse, therefore, expect to be listened to and to have their 
moral musings woven into the unfolding dominant storyline. 
The key to this co-telling role of equity, however, is the re-telling role 
of lawyers.  Drawing on the biblical narrative structure, we see that equity 
judges generate convicting sermons but that the apostolic role is critical to 
completing the didactic mission.  Perhaps a strong oral tradition in the prac-
tice of corporate law is effectively spreading equity’s moral word to corpo-
rate directors and officers.  But the epistolary genre, as in the biblical narra-
tive, nevertheless remains vital, and it is a moral (not a rules-based) dis-
course that needs habitual bolstering or good sermons will go unheard and, 
therefore, will not alter the overall business storyline. 
Corporate lawyers must reflect on their mediative role.  Rule-focused 
lawyers or, worse, “gamesters,”166 will not effectively discharge their part in 
passing along the full flavor of judicial teaching about fiduciary duties.  It is 
less a matter of the Stranger who knows how to ask questions,167 asking 
“where were the attorneys?”168 as a question of “who are the lawyers?”  Or, 
just perhaps, “who do they think they are?” 
  
 166. Christine E. Parker, Robert Eli Rosen & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, The Two 
Faces of Lawyers: Professional Ethics and Business Compliance with Regulation, 22 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 201 (2009). 
 167. See T. S. Eliot epigram supra, accompanying note **. 
 168. See Parker et al, supra note 166, at 202 (describing Judge Stanley Sporkin’s 
famous question to this effect about the savings and loan disasters in 1990 and how others 
have repeated it at times of corporate scandal thereafter).  
